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Acronyms
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Acronym Definition 
ADC Analog to Digital Converter 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AF Air Force
AMS Agile Mixed Signal
ARC Ames Research Center
ARM ARM Holdings Public Limited Company
Bayes Net Bayesian Networks
BN Bayesian Networks
CAN Controller Area Network
CAN-FD Controller Area Network Flexible Data-Rate
CCI Cache coherent interconnect
Codec a device or program that compresses data to enable faster transmission and decompresses received data
COF chemistry of failure
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSI2 Camera Serial Interface 2nd Generation
CU Control Unit
DCU Display Control Unit
DDR Double Data Rate (DDR3 = Generation 3; DDR4 =  Generation 4)
DEBUG identify and remove errors from (computer hardware or software)
DMA Direct Memory Access
DOA dead on arrival
DSP Digital Signal Processing
dSPI Dynamic Signal Processing Instrument
Dual Ch. Dual Channel
ECC Error-Correcting Code
EDAC error detection and correction
EEE Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
EMAC Equipment Monitor And Control
epi Epitaxy, the deposition of a crystalline overlayer on a crystalline substrate
ESD electrostatic discharge
eTimers Event Timers
FCCU Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit
FlexRay FlexRay Communication Controller
Gb Gigabyte
GIC Global Industry Classification
Gov't Government
GPU Graphics Processing Unit
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
GTH/GTY Transceiver Type
HDIO High Density Digital Input/Output
HDR High-Dynamic-Range
HPIO High Performance Input/Output
I/O input/output
Acronym Definition 
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
JPEG Joint Photographic Experts Group
JPL NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory
L2 Cache independent caches organized as a hierarchy (L1, L2, etc.)
LEO low earth orbit
LinFlex Local Interconnect Network Flexible
L-mem Long-Memory
LP Low Power
M/L BIST Memory/Logic Built-In Self-Test
MAIW Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop
MBMA model based mission assurance 
MBSE Model-Based Systems Engineering
MIPI Mobile Industry Processor Interface
NAND Negated AND or NOT AND
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging 
NOR Not OR logic gate
OCM on-chip RAM
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PCIe Gen2 Peripheral Component Interconnect Express Generation 2
POF Physics of Failure 
PS-GTR PS-GTR is a type of transceiver
R&D Research and Development
Rad Hard radiation hardened
RAM Random Access Memory
RGB Red, Green, and Blue
RH Radiation Hardened
RHA Radiation Hardeness Assurance
SAR Successive-Approximation-Register
SATA Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
SCU Secondary Control Unit
SD/eMMC Secure Digital embedded MultiMediaCard
SD-HC Secure Digital High Capacity
SEE Single Event Effect
SMMU System Memory Management Unit
SOC Systems on a Chip 
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SwaP Size, weight, and power
SysML System Modeling Language
TCM tightly-coupled memory
TID Total Ionizing Dose
TMR triple-modular redundancy
T-Sensor Temperature-Sensor
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
USB Universal Serial Bus
WDT watchdog timer
Zipwire Freescale Zipwire interface
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Abstract
• As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a 
lower cost model of development and operation via 
concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft 
(aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts 
screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized 
under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two 
basic concepts will be discussed:
– The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts 
methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate 
approaches; and,
– A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce 
overdesign as well emerging model based mission assurance 
(MBMA) concepts.
• Example scenarios will be described as well as 
consideration for trading traditional versus alternate 
methods.
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Outline
• The Changing Space Market
– Commercial Space and “Small” Space
• EEE Parts Assurance
• Modern Electronics
– Magpie Syndrome
• Breaking Tradition: Alternate Approaches
– Higher Assembly Level Tests
– Use of Fault Tolerance
• Mission Risk and EEE Parts
• Summary
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Hubble Space Telescope courtesy NASA
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Space Missions:
How Our Frontiers Have Changed
• Cost constraints and cost “effectiveness” have 
led to dramatic shifts away from traditional large-
scale missions (ex., Hubble Space Telescope).
• Two prime trends have surfaced:
– Commercial space ventures where the procuring agent 
“buys” a service or data product and the implementer is 
responsible for ensuring mission success with limited 
agent oversight. And,
– Small missions such as CubeSats that are allowed to 
take higher risks based on mission purpose and cost.
• These trends are driving the usage of non 
Mil/Aero parts such as Automotive grade and 
“architectural reliability” (aka, resilience) 
approaches.
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Michael Swartwout, "CubeSat Mission Success: 2017 Update (with a closer look at the effect of process management on outcome)," 
NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, 2017 NEPP Electronics Technology Workshop, June 26-29, 2017.
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NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, 2017 NEPP Electronics Technology Workshop, June 26-29, 2017.
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SERESSA 2017 the 13th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems for Space 
Applications, Munich (Garching), Germany, October 23-26, 2017. 9
EEE Parts Assurance
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Assurance for EEE Parts
• Assurance is knowledge of
• The supply chain and manufacturer of the product 
• The manufacturing process and its controls
• The physics of failure (POF) and chemistry of failure 
(COF) related to the technology.
• Statistical process and inspection via
– Testing, inspection, physical analyses and modeling.
» Audits, process data analysis, electrostatic 
discharge (ESD), …
• Test/Qualification/Screening methods
– Understanding the application and 
environmental conditions for device usage.
• This includes:
– Radiation, Lifetime, Temperature, Vacuum, etc., as well as,
– Device application and appropriate derating criteria.
10
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Taking a Step Back…
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Physics of 
failure (POF)
Chemistry of 
failure (COF)
Screening/
Qualification
Methods
Mission
Reliability/
Success
Application/
Environment
It’s not just the technology, but how to view the need for safe 
insertion into space programs.
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Reliability and Availability
• Reliability (Wikipedia)
– The ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of 
time.
• Will it work for as long as you need?
• Availability (Wikipedia)
– The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is in 
a specified operable and committable state at the start of a 
mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e., a 
random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time 
a system is in a functioning condition. This is often described 
as a mission capable rate.
• Will it be available when you need it to work?
• Combining the two drives mission requirements:
– Will it work for as long as and when you need it to?
12
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What does this mean for EEE parts?
• The more understanding you 
have of a device’s failure modes 
and causes, the higher the 
confidence level that it will 
perform under mission 
environments and lifetime
– High confidence = “it has to work”
• High confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
– Less confidence = “it may to work”
• Less confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
• It may work, but prior to flight there 
is less certainty.
13
CONFIDENCE
LEVEL
– INDESTRUCTIBLE
– STURDY
– STABLE
– INCREASING
– FINE
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SERESSA 2017 the 13th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems for Space 
Applications, Munich (Garching), Germany, October 23-26, 2017.
Traditional EEE Parts
Approach to Confidence
• Part level screening
– Electronic component screening uses environmental 
stressing and electrical testing to identify marginal and 
defective components within a procured lot of EEE parts.
• Part level qualification
– Qualification processes are designed to statistically 
understand/remove known reliability risks and uncover 
other unknown risks inherent in a part.
14
• Requires significant 
sample size and 
comprehensive suite of 
piecepart testing (insight) 
– high confidence
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However, tradition doesn’t match the 
changing space market.
Alternate EEE parts approaches that 
may be “good enough” are being used.
(Discussed later in presentation.)
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Modern Electronics
A History Lesson
17
Military and Aerospace share is estimated at ~$3.1B in 2015.
Aerospace is a small percentage of this amount.
For comparison, in 1975
the Military and Aerospace market share was ~$50%!
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EEE parts are available in “grades”
• Grades – Designed, certified, qualified, and/or 
tested for specific environmental characteristics.
– E.g., Operating temperature range, vacuum, radiation, 
exposure,…
• Examples: Aerospace, Military, Space Enhanced 
Product, Enhanced Product, Automotive, Medical, 
Extended-Temperature-Commercial, and 
Commercial.
– Aerospace Grade is the traditional choice for space usage, but 
has relatively few available parts and their performance lags 
behind commercial counterparts (speed, power).
• Designed and tested for radiation and reliability for space usage.
• NASA uses a wide range of EEE part grades 
depending on many factors (technical, 
programmatic, and risk).
18
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The Magpie Syndrome:
The Electrical Designer’s Dilemma
• Magpie’s are known for being attracted to bright, 
shiny things.
• In many ways, the modern electrical engineer is a 
Magpie:
– They are attracted to the latest state-of-the-art devices 
and EEE parts technologies.
• Usually any grade of EEE parts that aren’t qualified for 
space nor radiation hardened.
– These bright and shiny parts may have very attractive 
performance features that aren’t available in higher-
reliability parts:
• Size, weight, and power (SwaP),
• Integrated functionality,
• Speed of data collection/transfer,
• Processing capability, etc…
19
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Example Magpie EEE Parts
20
Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+
Multi-Processor System on a Chip (MPSoC) -
16nm CMOS with Vertical FinFETS
Xilinx.com
Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS)
Sensor Fusion Processor
Freescale.com
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Gartner Hype Cycle –
Reality of Shiny New Things
21
http://www.gartner.com
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Magpie Constraints
• But Magpies aren’t designed for space flight
– Just some aviary aviation at best!
• Sample differences include:
– Temperature ranges,
– Vacuum performance,
– Shock and vibration,
– Lifetime, and
– Radiation tolerance.
• Traditionally, “upscreening” at the part level has 
occurred.
– Definition: A means of assessing a portion of the 
inherent reliability of a device via test and analysis.
• It’s not increasing reliability!
– Note: Discovery of a upscreened part failure occurs 
regularly.
22
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When Should a Magpie Fly?
• Mil/Aero alternatives are not available,
– Ex., SWaP or functionality or procurement schedule,
• A mission has a relatively short lifetime or benign space 
environment exposure,
– Ex., 3 month CubeSat mission in LEO,
• A system can assume possible unknown risks,
– Ex., technology demonstration mission,
• Device upscreening (per mission requirements) and system 
validation are performed to obtain confidence in usage,
• System level assurances based on fault tolerance, higher 
assembly level test, and adequate validation are deemed 
sufficient.
– This is a systems engineering trade that takes a multi-
disciplinary review.
• As a pathfinder for future usage.
– Out of scope for this talk: use of flight data for “qualification”.
23
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Mission Risk and EEE Parts
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Understanding Risk
• The risk management requirements 
may be broken into three 
considerations
– Technical/Design – “The Good”
• Relate to the circuit designs not being able to 
meet mission criteria such as jitter related to a 
long dwell time of a telescope on an object
– Programmatic – “The Bad”
• Relate to a mission missing a launch window or 
exceeding a budgetary cost cap which can lead to 
mission cancellation
– Radiation/Reliability – “The Ugly”
• Relate to mission meeting its lifetime and 
performance goals without premature failures or 
unexpected anomalies
• Each mission must determine its priorities 
among the three risk types Graphic from Free Vector Art.
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Background: Traditional Risk Matrix
Risk Tolerance Boundary
Placed on the profile to reflect
Corporate “Risk Appetite”
Caution Zone
Risks in the “yellow” area
need constant vigilance
and regular audit
By adjusting the level of
currency hedging, resources
can be released to help fund
improvements to protection of
the production facility.
Likelihood Scale: A: Very High B: High C: Occasional D: Low E: Very Low F: Almost Impossible
Impact Scale: I: Catastrophic II: Critical III: Significant IV: Marginal
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Space Missions:
EEE Parts and Risk
• The determination of acceptability for device 
usage is a complex trade space.
– Every engineer will “solve” a problem differently:
• Ex., software versus hardware solutions.
• The following chart proposes an alternate 
mission risk matrix approach for EEE parts 
based on:
– Environment exposure,
– Mission lifetime, and,
– Criticality of implemented function.
• Notes:
– “COTS” implies any grade that is not space qualified 
and radiation hardened.
– Level 1 and 2 refer to traditional space qualified EEE 
parts.
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Notional EEE Parts Selection Factors
High Level 1 or 2 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad hard 
suggested. 
Full upscreening for 
COTS. 
Fault tolerant designs 
for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad 
hard 
recommended. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Medium COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested 
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended. 
Fault-tolerance 
recommended
Level 1 or 2, rad
hard suggested. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Low COTS upscreening/
testing optional. 
Do no harm (to 
others)
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested. 
Do no harm (to others)
Rad hard 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerance 
recommended
Low Medium High
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A Few Details on the “Matrix”
• When to test:
– “Optional”
• Implies that you might get away without this, but there’s residual risk.
– “Suggested”
• Implies that it is good idea to do this, and likely some risk if you don’t. 
– “Recommended”
• Implies that this really should be done or you’ll definitely have some 
risk.
– Where just the item is listed (like “full upscreening for COTS”) 
• This should be done to meet the criticality and environment/lifetime 
concerns.
• The higher the level of risk acceptance by a mission, the higher 
the consideration for performing alternate assembly level testing 
versus traditional part level.
• All fault tolerance must be validated.
29
Good mission planning identifies where on the matrix a EEE part lies.
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Breaking Tradition:
Alternate Approaches to EEE Parts 
Assurance
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SERESSA 2017 the 13th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems for Space 
Applications, Munich (Garching), Germany, October 23-26, 2017.
Assembly Testing:
Can it Replace Testing at the Parts Level?
We can test devices,
but how do we test 
systems?
Or better yet, systems of 
systems on a chip (SOC)?
31
NASA GSFC Picture of FPGA tester.
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Not All Assemblies are Equal
• Consider two distinct categories of assemblies:
– Off the shelf (you get what you get) such as COTS, and,
– Custom (possibility of having specific “design for test”)
• Still won’t be as complete as single part level testing, but it 
does reduce some challenges.
• For COTS assemblies, some specific concerns 
include: 
– Bill-of-materials may not include lot date codes or device 
manufacturer information.
– Individual part application may not be known or datasheet 
unavailable.
– The possible variances for “copies” of the “same” assembly:
• Form, fit, and function EEE parts may mean various 
manufacturers, or, 
• Lot-to-lot and even device-to-device differences in 
reliability/availability.
32
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Sample Challenges for
Testing Assemblies
• Limited statistics versus part level approaches due to sample size.
• Inspection constraints.
• Reliability acceleration factors
– Temperature testing limited to “weakest” part.
– Voltage testing may be limited by on-board/on-chip power regulation.
• Limited test points and I/O = inadequate visibility of 
errors/failures/faults.
• Inadequate fault coverage testing.
• System operation.
– Ex., Using nominal flight software versus a high stress test approach.
• Error propagation
– An error occurs, but does not propagate outward until some time later 
due to system operations such as those of an interrupt register.
• Fault masking during radiation exposure
– Too high a particle rate or too many devices being exposed 
simultaneously.
33
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Using Fault Tolerance to Improve 
“Reliability/Availability” 
• Operational
– Ex., no operation in the South Atlantic Anomaly (proton hazard)
• System
– Ex., redundant boxes/busses or swarms of nanosats
• Circuit/software
– Ex., error detection and correction (EDAC) scrubbing of memory devices by 
an external device or processor
• Device (part)
– Ex., triple-modular redundancy (TMR) of internal logic within the device
• Transistor
– Ex., use of annular transistors for Total Ionizing Dose (TID) improvement
• Material
– Ex., addition of an epi substrate to reduce Single Event Effect (SEE) charge 
collection (or other substrate engineering)
Good engineers can invent infinite solutions,
but the solution used must be adequately validated.
It’s easy to show a working block diagram, it’s hard to 
provide sufficient validation details.
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Possible Exceptions: 
Is Radiation Testing Always Required for COTS?
• Operational
– Ex., The device is only powered on once per orbit and the 
sensitive time window for a single event effect is minimal
• Acceptable data loss
– Ex., System level error rate (availability) may be set such 
that data is gathered 95% of the time.
• Given physical device volume and assuming every ion 
causes an upset, this worst-case rate may be tractable.
• Negligible effect
– Ex., A 2 week mission on space station may have a very 
low Total Ionizing Dose (TID) requirement.
A flash memory may be acceptable 
without testing if a low TID 
requirement exists or not powered on 
for the large majority of time.
Memory picture courtesy
NASA/GSFC, Code 561
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Is knowledge of EEE Parts Failure Modes
Required To Build a Fault Tolerant System?
• The system may work, but is there adequate 
confidence in the system to meet reliability and 
availability after launch?
• In no particular order:
– What are the “unknown unknowns”?
• Can we account for them?
– How do you adequately validate a fault tolerant system 
for space? 
• This is a critical point.
– How do you calculate risk with unscreened/untested 
EEE parts?
– Do you have a common mode failure potential in your 
design? 
• I.e., a design with identical redundant strings rather than 
having independent redundant strings.
36
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Bottom Line on
Assembly Testing and Fault Tolerance
• While clearly ANY testing is better 
than none, assembly testing has 
limitations compared to the individual 
EEE part level.
– This is a risk-trade that’s still to be 
understood.
– No definitive study exists comparing this 
approach versus traditional parts 
qualification and screening.
• Fault tolerance needs to be validated.
– Understanding the fault and failure 
signatures is required to design 
appropriate tolerance.
– The more complex the system, the harder 
the validation is.
37
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Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)
• Motivation
- Commercial parts (COTS)
- Document-centric work flow to 
model-based system 
engineering
- System mitigation (for COTS)
- Single source of system 
design parameters
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Overview of Modeling Languages Used -
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
Presented at NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, August 29-30, 2017.
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NEPP (w/ NASA MBMA Program)
Pieces to the puzzle (partial)
Emerging Architecture
Vanderbilt University
Web-based tool (SEAM)
Exemplars and Training for MBMA
Vanderbilt University
GSN Exemplar (SEE) – complete
TBD
GSN Exemplar – EEE parts reliability
Tools for Radiation Reliability
NASA/GSFC (Berg)
SEE Classic Reliability
Vanderbilt
CRÈME Toolsuite
Vanderbilt
BN Model + Integrating into SEAM
NASA/GSFC (Xapsos) 
RHA Confidence Approach
Developing Requirements and Goals
NASA/GSFC (Campola) - Vanderbilt
Notional RHA Tool (R-GENTIC)
NASA/GSFC (Xapsos) 
RHA Confidence Approach
Understanding the Small Mission 
Universe
Saint Louis University
CubeSat Success Study
JPL
CubeSat EEE Parts Database Studies
Aerospace (proposed)
CubeSat Kit Vendor Survey
COTS Data
GSFC
NEPP/Radhome data
(+ collaborations)
GSFC
IEEE REDW access
GSFC/JPL (new data)
CubeSat EEE Parts Testing
Knowledge Sharing
Integration with S3VI 
(NASA/ARC)
GSFC
ESA Small Mission RHA
TBD
Resilience, autonomy
https://modelbasedassurance.org/ 
Reliable less than MIL
Aerospace (proposed)
Space Enhanced Performance 
(SEP) Electronics Grade Study
Best Practices (Process and Test)
NASA/GSFC (Campola)
Small Mission RHA
NASA/GSFC
Small Mission EEE Parts Best Practices
NASA/GSFC (Xapsos) 
RHA Confidence Approach
GSFC
Board Level Testing and EEE Part Reliability
JPL
Board Level Proton Testing
40
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Summary
• In this talk, we have presented:
– An overview of considerations for alternate EEE parts 
approaches:
• Technical, programmatic, and risk-oriented
– Every mission views the relative priorities differently.
• As seen below, every decision type may have a 
process.
– It’s all in developing an appropriate one for your 
application and avoiding “buyer’s remorse”!
Five stages of Consumer Behavior
P. Kotler and G. Armstrong, "Consider Purchase Decision Process Model Reference," Principles of Marketing, 2001.
